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Competitiveness of the Internet Industry in Korea and Japan:  






Korea’s well-developed mobile telephony network infrastructure makes it a 
globally competitive country in the field of wireless Internet. Korea Telecom Freetel 
has enjoyed the ‘early-mover’ advantage in the wireless Internet industry in Korea, 
although it was a ‘late-comer’ in the mobile telephony industry. The competition, 
however, is becoming harsher than ever, and the company is now seeking a 
breakthrough. For benchmarking, Japan’s NTT DoCoMo was chosen for its 
tremendous success in the world’s first commercialization of the wireless Internet. 
Using the diamond model (Porter 1990; Moon, Rugman and Verbeke 1998), the 
variables are analyzed and strategic recommendations are provided. One important 
conclusion is that Korea Telecom Freetel is taking advantage of its E-business 
implementation, but can be more competitive if its business environment is less 
restrictive. The results of this research will help policymakers as well as business 





Recently, the Internet has been expanding its territory from wired network into wireless 
network.  Some analysts firmly believe that the use of the wireless Internet will surpass that 
of the wired Internet by the year 2003. Although both Korea and Japan are the early movers 
in the wireless Internet industry in the global market, Korea is not yet as competitive as 
Japan. The main purpose of this research is to compare and contrast the Internet industries of 
Korea and Japan, and to suggest some strategic guidelines for Korea to enhance its 
international competitiveness in the Internet industry.  
As Korea began to recover from its economic crisis in 1999, it experienced a significant 
spread of the Internet usage supported by the change with Korea’s informational 
infrastructure. The number of subscribers of high-speed access lines has increased sharply, 
and the line speed has also evolved from the ISDN lines (up to 128Kb/sec) to the ADSL or 
CATV lines (up to 10Mb/sec). The number of PC rooms or cyber cafés, which are equipped 
with high-speed access line service, has also increased. Despite some structural imbalance 
problems, the wired network infrastructure of Korea dramatically improved in a very short 
time frame. However, the usage of wired Internet has certain physical limitations. Items such 
as high speed access lines and PCs with connecting devices are necessary preconditions for 
access to wired Internet. 
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On the other hand, Korea has been one of the leading countries with increasing wireless 
telephone users since mid 1990s. As evidence, almost half the population possessed their 
own cellular phones in the year 2000.  However, people who were already acquainted with 
the variety and convenience of the wired Internet, were not satisfied with the simple 
technological functions of their cellular phones such as voice transfer and limited text. 
Therefore, the fusion of two favorite information technologies was inevitable. Now, the two 
axes of the informational revolution met – The wireless Internet is on the market. 
Korea Telecom Freetel (hereinafter KTF), an affiliate of Korea Telecom (hereinafter KT) 
for wireless telecommunication, was first in starting wireless Internet service in Korea in 
October 1999. The company has clearly enjoyed the ‘early-mover’ advantage and soon 
boasted the greatest number of wireless Internet subscribers in Korea. However, there is still 
room for enhancing its competitiveness to achieve further success. Appropriate strategies for 
this purpose will be addressed later in this paper.  
In February 1999, Japan’s first attempt at commercializing the wireless Internet was a 
huge success. NTT DoCoMo, an affiliation of NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 
Corporation), was the early entrant in the Japanese wireless Internet market. In many ways, 
KTF and NTT DoCoMo are quite comparable. Their parent companies share similar 
characteristics and their host countries, Korea and Japan, share close geographical proximity 
as well as similar economic structures. For these reasons NTT DoCoMo was selected as the 





We will use the diamond model to analyze the competitiveness of KTF and NTT 
DoCoMo.  This model was originally developed by Porter (1990), and improved by other 
scholars (Moon, Rugman and Verbeke 1998). The model is very useful and widely used in 
analyzing the international competitiveness of nations, industries, and firms. The diamond 
model is particularly useful when several competing firms need to be simultaneously 
contrasted along different dimensions of business operations. Sun Tzu (1986), the famous 
ancient Chinese military strategist, said in The Art of War: “One who knows the enemy and 
knows himself will not be in danger in a hundred battles.” The diamond model is a very 
versatile and powerful tool for this purpose.  
Originally, the diamond model was the result of a series of analyses of a nation’s 
competitiveness (Porter 1990). However, its insufficient insight about internationality, 
governmental impact and cultural background was criticized by scholars including Rugman 
(1991), and Moon, Rugman, and Verbeke (1998). After some improvements, the diamond 
model was modified to fit an analysis of an industry’s competitiveness (Moon and Kim 
1999). 
In this paper, the diamond model will be used for analyzing business strategies at both 
industry and firm levels. In the wireless Internet industry, NTT DoCoMo’s current situation 
represents the future trend that KTF may want to benchmark. Therefore, we collected the 
data of both companies and compiled them into two groups – before and after the wireless 
Internet business, and indexed them to fit into the model. There are some restrictions on the 
use of the data in this paper. Most of the KTF’s data were from its internal reports, so we 
changed and modified some figures within the boundary that does not change the result of 
the research to avoid any undesirable impact. The ‘before’ time period for KTF is December 
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31, 1999, and ‘after’ is May 31, 2000, while February 28, 1999 and May 31, 2000 are the 
respective before and after periods for NTT DoCoMo. 
We then categorized all the data into four dimensions following the typical diamond 
model: factor conditions; demand conditions; related and supporting industry; and firm 
structure, strategy, and rivalry. We then added two more dimensions, which were not 
independently referred to in the original diamond model: the governmental effect and parent 
company’ effect.  
To draw the diamond figure, we set NTT DoCoMo’s data as a calculation basis of having 
a fixed scale of 5, using a maximum scale of 10 for each dimension. We also gave numerical 
values on qualitative determinants to draw quantitative figures.  
We will begin with a brief history of KTF and then analyze its current situation of 
wireless Internet service using the diamond model. Next, we will compare all the dimensions 
of KTF with those of NTT DoCoMo and suggest strategic recommendations for KTF. 
 
 
Figure 1. The diamond model for KTF’s wireless Internet service 
 
 
3. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
When KTF, as an affiliation of KT, started its business in October 1997, there were four 
other competitors in the wireless telephony industry led by SK Telecom. Despite the 
disadvantage of “late entry,” KTF succeeded in increasing subscribers within a relatively 
short period of time and inducing investments from foreign companies including Microsoft 
and Qualcomm.   
KTF started its wireless Internet service (named PersNet) in September 1999, only seven 
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months after NTT DoCoMo’s wireless Internet service (named i-mode) was launched. But 
the number of the PersNet subscribers did not significantly increase until December 1999, 
while i-mode enjoyed immediate success. However, by the beginning of the year 2000, the 
number of PersNet subscribers exploded and KTF won first place among its competitors. 
However, the competition is becoming tougher, and KTF needs to consider new strategies to 
stay competitive in the market. We will now analyze the competitiveness determinants in 
detail. 
 
3.1. Factor Conditions 
 
We divided the determinants of factor conditions into three groups: financial structure, 
human resources, and core capabilities. Financial structure is a basic condition while human 
resources and core capabilities are the advanced conditions. All the data values are presented 
in table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Factor Conditions 
 
KTF NTT DoCoMo 
Variables 
Before After Before After 
Sales Structure 
(Data/Voice) 
0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 1.60% 
Credit Rate  
of Corporate 
Bond 
A A A A Financial 
Structure 
R&D Expense  
in the wireless 
Internet 




844 987 13,720 15,100 
Subscribers per 
Employee 






2,663 2,577 2,386 2,586 
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Public 
Recognition 
High High High High 
Core 
Capabilities Image and 
Brand 
Preference 
High Mid High High 
Source: KTF Financial Report - Fiscal year of 1999 (2000), Internal Report (2000), 
NTT DoCoMo Financial Report - Fiscal year of 1998 (1999), 1999 (2000) 
 
To analyze the financial structure of KTF and NTT DoCoMo, we selected three variables. 
The first variable is the changing situation of the industry (sales portion of data transmission 
vs. voice transmission). The second variable is the factor that attracts foreign investors 
(credit rate of corporate bond).  The last variable is the intention to develop more advanced 
technology needed for the wireless Internet (R&D expenses on the wireless Internet).  
NTT DoCoMo’s sales portion of data transmission is larger than KTF’s due to  the time 
gap of starting the service. The absolute numbers, however, are fairly small, compared with 
the voice transmission sales. The credit rates of both companies are extremely good. It is 
partly because both companies are the affiliates of the two nations’ telecommunication 
monopolies. With the booming environment of the Internet industry’s expectations and 
prospects, KTF has succeeded in drawing some foreign investment. R&D expenses on the 
wireless Internet are smaller than we expected. Both companies are preparing the IMT-2000 
service and the portion of that R&D expense is increasing faster than that of the wireless 
Internet itself. However, the expenses are still large, reflecting their interests in maintaining a 
continuous and stable network with a fast development speed. 
As a matter of fact, a company like KTF – the network provider – need not have its own 
special technologies except for its network stabilization and customer billing system, which 
are related to the demand conditions for customer services.  Most of the technologies used 
are in cooperation with the related and supporting industries such as handset manufacturers, 
content providers, portal service providers, and some financiers for non-cash payment 
through strategic alliances. 
One of the main determinants of the advanced conditions is human resources. In KTF’s 
case, the government controlled recruiting restriction is the most serious and urgent problem 
that has to be solved. The governmental restriction is an out-dated example of red-tape 
bureaucracy. In this industry, human resources are the most powerful factor for survival and 
prosperity in the severely competitive environment. Despite the problem, each of KTF’s 
regular employees has been succeeding in enrolling more customers than other domestic 
competitors and KTF has also been a leader in the number of sales per employee.  
Although a network provider like KTF does not need any specific technology, the 
company has its own core capabilities. The inborn merit of being an affiliate of KT can be a 
core capability – the public recognition and the reliability of the parent company. KTF 
succeeded in capturing the lion’s share in the domestic wireless Internet market despite the 
inferiority of the existing wireless voice telecommunications market. This was basically 
attributable to the “early mover advantage” strategy in the market. But continuous success in 
the wireless Internet needs innovative images that can meet the market trend (young, fast, 
easily accepting, etc). However, current company images of KT (conservative, big and slow, 
old, stubborn, etc) can harm or cannibalize the innovative image and the brand recognition of 
KTF. KTF realizes that it must accommodate its customers more through advertising. In 
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contrast, NTT DoCoMo is in a better position because it faces less intervention by its parent 
company and the government compared to KTF.  
 
3.2. Demand Conditions 
 
KTF is in a transition period from voice services to data services. In analyzing demand 
conditions, we also segregated the variables into two distinct areas - before and after the 
wireless Internet. By comparing the market shares of KTF before and after the wireless 
Internet service, we will show the impact of the E-business on KTF.   
The total number of mobile phone subscribers in Korea is 20 million. The number of 
KTF's mobile phone subscribers was 4.2 million at the end of the year 1999. As of May 31, 
2000, there were 5 million KTF mobile phone subscribers. During the five-month period, 
mobile phone subscribers increased by 19 percent. The total number of KTF subscribers who 
were using the wireless Internet increased from zero to 500,000 during the same period of 
time. Although the growth rate is remarkable, the market shows that the voice service market 
is getting saturated and very competitive. KTF's current growth rate is becoming moderate 
compared to the growth rate KTF has achieved in the past.  
 
Table 2. Demand Conditions   
 
KTF NTT DoCoMo 
Variables 
Before After Before After 
Number of Total 
Subscribers 
4.2 Million 5.0 Million 23.9 Million 30.4 Million 
Market Share in 
Mobile Telephony 
18.20% 18.60% 57.50% 57.40% 
Number of Subscribers  
Using the Wireless 
Internet 
0 Million 0.5 Million 3.3 Million 7.3 Million 
Source: KTF Internal Report (2000), The Electronic Times (July 2000), 
          NTT DoCoMo Homepage – http://www.nttdocomo.com 
 
After KTF began its wireless Internet service, 500,000 of KTF’s customers were using 
the Internet via mobile phones. Currently, about 10 percent of the KTF mobile phone 
subscribers are using the wireless Internet. Most of the wireless Internet users are under the 
age of 40. Users in their 20s and 30s are the major users, but teenage users spend the most 
time in using a variety of the wireless Internet services. It has not been measured 
quantitatively, but it appears that the interests of the teenage users are closely related to the 
Internet environment. Considering the growth rate of market penetration, these results show 
that customers want different types of services. 
KTF will have to provide new services through E-business, including the wireless 
Internet. There are 5 million KTF mobile phone subscribers and among them 500,000 use the 
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Internet through a mobile phone. This means that KTF has another 4.5 million potential 
subscribers who may want to use PersNet. KTF's mobile phone subscribers are the 
company’s important asset and should be kept loyal to the company.  
For benchmarking, we compared KTF with NTT DoCoMo. We studied NTT DoCoMo's 
market share before and after E-business. NTT DoCoMo began to provide data services 
through i-mode in February 1999. The company has had an incredible growth rate since it 
started i-mode, which provides data services through mobile phone. NTT DoCoMo's market 
share is currently 57.4 percent. KTF has improved its demand conditions since it launched E-
business. However, KTF has not been as successful as NTT DoCoMo. The comparison of 
the two companies’ competitiveness figures (Table 2) will provide KTF with strategic 
guidelines for enhancing its competitiveness on various dimensions.  
 
3.3. Firm Structure, Strategy, and Rivalry 
 
We studied the competitiveness of firm strategy, structure, and rivalry (SSR) of KTF 
comparing before and after E-business. E-business can be categorized into two dimensions: 
E-commerce as an external transaction and E-management as an internal activity. This last 
dimension, SSR, is mainly related to the internal managing and strategic activities that can be 
categorized as E-management dimension.  
The variables of SSR are divided into six categories: integration, transparency, efficiency, 
simplicity, flexibility, and rivalry. Each category has its own measurement, which is used in 
the questionnaire for the empirical fieldwork. 
- Integration: Ease of company data sharing, Company-wide vision sharing, Integration of 
departmental strategies 
- Transparency: Non-existence of company corruption, Ease of leadership estimation, 
Management transparency 
- Flexibility: Ease of strategic correction, Outsourcing 
- Simplicity: Ease of decision-making, Slim structure, Ease of process standardization 
- Efficiency: Increase in job efficiency 
- Rivalry: Increase in the number of competitors 
For the empirical study, we interviewed 40 middle management positions employees in 
KTF. We distributed a questionnaire and analyzed the responses into 6 categories. The 
















Table 3.  Survey Questionnaire for SSR 
Do you think following items improved after implementing E-business? 
 
 
 No So-So Yes 
Q1. Ease of decision-
making 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q2. Ease of company 
data sharing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q3. Company-wide 
vision sharing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q4. Decrease of 
company corruption 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q5. Management 
Transparency 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q6. Integration of Dept 
strategies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q7. Increase of job 
efficiency 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q8. Ease of leadership 
estimation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q9. Ease of process 
standardzation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q10. Slim structure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q11. Outsourcing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q12. Ease of strategic 
correction. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q13. Increase in 
number of rivalries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Table 4. Survey Results for SSR 
 
Interviewee Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 
1 5 7 8 5 5 7 7 7 8 8 7 3 8 
2 6 4 4 7 7 5 5 4 7 7 7 4 7 
3 4 6 3 2 4 6 5 5 8 5 8 4 8 
4 7 8 8 8 9 7 8 6 5 5 7 9 7 
5 6 5 7 9 9 7 7 8 7 5 10 5 10 
6 8 6 6 8 8 5 8 7 8 6 8 8 5 
7 8 6 3 3 5 5 8 7 5 5 5 3 5 
8 8 7 5 7 8 9 9 4 5 6 6 4 6 
9 6 7 8 8 8 7 8 9 9 9 9 8 8 
10 8 8 7 7 9 5 7 7 8 4 6 6 6 
11 4 7 5 3 3 3 8 3 3 5 3 3 9 
12 8 8 7 5 8 9 8 8 9 9 9 7 8 
13 6 5 5 5 5 8 8 6 7 6 6 7 6 
14 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 3 3 3 2 4 3 
15 8 8 3 5 7 9 8 8 7 5 7 5 9 
16 7 6 3 4 4 4 8 6 8 8 7 4 6 
17 8 8 7 6 8 7 7 8 8 5 5 6 9 
18 4 8 3 7 3 3 8 5 5 9 8 6 9 
19 4 3 7 6 6 6 7 6 3 2 3 3 9 
20 8 7 7 7 8 7 9 8 6 5 6 8 9 
21 5 3 3 8 10 7 7 3 8 5 7 3 3 
22 8 9 6 6 6 9 8 7 8 9 8 8 8 
23 6 5 5 5 5 4 7 6 7 4 6 5 5 
24 8 5 3 6 8 7 8 5 6 3 8 5 5 
25 8 8 8 8 8 7 8 8 7 9 9 7 9 
26 8 8 7 7 8 8 9 7 8 8 7 7 9 
27 6 4 7 4 4 3 7 5 6 5 6 3 3 
28 6 5 7 8 8 5 4 8 5 3 3 8 8 
29 6 6 6 7 6 5 7 5 7 5 5 5 5 
30 8 8 5 5 7 9 9 5 8 6 5 6 6 
31 8 7 3 6 6 6 7 7 8 7 8 3 8 
32 8 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 6 6 8 8 
33 8 5 5 5 5 7 8 6 8 7 5 5 5 
34 9 6 6 4 5 7 8 7 7 7 4 6 4 
35 5 4 6 6 6 4 6 4 5 4 5 5 5 
36 6 7 7 5 4 6 6 5 5 6 9 7 5 
37 8 9 7 4 3 3 8 4 3 3 7 3 10 
38 5 5 5 6 4 4 8 4 3 5 5 3 6 
39 5 8 6 8 8 7 8 5 8 6 7 7 8 
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40 8 8 9 5 6 8 8 7 8 7 9 8 6 
Sum 266 255 229 236 253 248 297 242 263 232 258 219 273 
Avg 6.7 6.4 5.7 5.9 6.3 6.2 7.4 6.1 6.6 5.8 6.5 5.5 6.8 
Increase % 33.0 27.5 14.5 18.0 26.5 24.0 48.5 21.0 31.5 16.0 29.0 9.5 36.5 
Avg Increase 24.9             
 
As shown in Table 4, the survey results show that the competitiveness of KTF in SSR has 
increased 24.9% after E-business. We can see specific findings for each category as follows: 
- Simplicity: Slim structure has not been fully completed although the decision-making 
process has been simplified from five to three steps 
- Integration: Thanks to process standardization and ease of communication, strategy 
integration has been enhanced  
- Efficiency: It has benefitted the most after the introduction of E-business 
- Transparency: Management transparency has sharply been enhanced 
- Flexibility: Outsourcing has been very active in KTF due to the government regulation 
on the number of employees, although timely strategic correction has not been made 
- Rivalry: The number of competitors has increased sharply by 36.5 percent. However, 
unlike the competitiveness analysis of nations using the diamond model, an increased 
number of competitors may be controversial as to whether it should be regarded as a 
competitive gain or not.  
To sum up the competitiveness changes in SSR, KTF has experienced dramatic changes 
in every SSR area with the implementation of E-business, especially in outsourcing and 
decision-making steps. Unfortunately, the benefits of improved outsourcing and decision-
making have not yet led to the full-scale realization of flexible and slim structure of the 
company. There is room for improvement. 
 
3.4. Related and Supporting Sectors  
 
The mobile Internet has influenced it Is related and supporting (R&S) sectors in various 
ways. In some cases, the start of mobile Internet service began new businesses such as 
wireless portal services, mobile Internet games, and mobile Internet content providers. New 
business through mobile Internet also activates other service areas such as payment by digital 
cash.   
Traditional and typical R&S sectors of wireless carriers are manufacturers of mobile 
handsets and mobile systems. The service of wireless carriers has been heavily dependent on 
the technical evolution of handset and system vendors. This tendency continues in the E-
business era. In order to provide mobile Internet service, wireless carriers need to set up a 
new system or change their network system for Internet access. The development of Inter 
Working Function (IWF) that provides modem and router functions in wireless networks and 
wireless internet terminals such as Internet phones and smart phones is a good example of 
how other industries support wireless carriers. Handset and system vendors are trying to 
meet the wireless carrier’s needs and requirements arising from the change from voice based 
service to data based service. 
However, there is a big difference in the scope of R&S sectors between "before E-
business" and "after E-business." After E-business, new R&S sectors are emerging from the 
E-business area. Wireless portal, which is a new concept of business starting from mobile 
Internet, is being served in the mobile Internet environment. Contents, entertainments and 
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games are available with wireless portals, and these portals are trying to evolve to M-
commerce activation. The emergence of wireless portal shows how E-business stimulates the 
creation of new businesses. The number of wireless portal service providers is drastically on 
the rise, supplying various services with various contents. 
In addition to wireless portals, E-business makes wireless carriers forge a relationship 
with existing industries. Banks, stock companies, and credit card companies seek to make 
alliances with wireless carriers for the development of new services in the mobile Internet 
environment. A new way of payment, digital cash, is becoming an essential part of M-
commerce and wireless carriers should determine which digital cash company is suitable for 
strategic alliance. Therefore, the number of strategic alliance partners in each R&S sector is 
increasing. The scope of wireless carriers’ R&S sector is getting wider and wider in the E-
business era.   
To compare KTF and NTT DoCoMo, the selected variables for analysis are the number 
of handset manufacturers, the number of produced handsets, the number of wireless portals, 
and the growth rate of advertisement in the Internet. The number of strategic alliance 
partners is also considered to compare the competitiveness of KTF and NTT DoCoMo. The 
result is shown in Table 5. One interesting finding is that KTF has more handset vendors than 
NTT DoCoMo, although NTT DoCoMo produces more handsets than KTF.  
 
Table 5. R&S∗ 
 
KTF NTT DoCoMo 
Variables 












10 Million 3 Million 27 Million 15 Million 
Indirect 
% Change in 
Promotion 
Expenses 





3 3 5 12 
 Source: KTF Internal Report (2000),  
                NTT DoCoMo Homepage – http://www.nttdocomo.com, 
                Korea Internet Marketing Center – http://www.marketcast.co.kr 
                The Electronic Times, Korea Economic Daily, Maeil Business Newspaper,  
                The Chosun Ilbo, The Donga Ilbo, Businessweek, Fortune Magazine 
                                                                    
∗ The data values on this table are reasonably estimated, because there are significant 
differences in data gathered from a variety of sources. 
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3.5. The Government 
 
The Korean government has a great impact on KTF in various ways. However, the 
government’s influence on KTF has had more negative effects on its business activities than 
positive effects. First, the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) appoints the 
auditor of KTF, who can have an internal influence on managerial decisions at the board of 
director’s meetings.  
Second, several government agencies such as the Ministry of Planning and Budget 
(MPB) and the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) implement audits that require much 
time and energy for KTF. Although KTF is a private corporation that is composed of many 
individual shareholders, government agencies control KTF. 
Third, the MPB limits the number of employees. As a result, KTF cannot recruit enough 
employees to implement its key businesses such as the wireless Internet. Due to an 
insufficient number of employees, KTF employees have an increased workload. As a result, 
some capable people may want to leave the company.  
Fourth, the MPB directs KTF policies. Budget and employees’ fringe benefit plans are 
among those areas. Furthermore, KTF cannot unilaterally raise the employees’ salary nor can 
it implement stock options or fringe benefit plans that improve employees’ welfare. The 
government’s intervention in KTF makes KTF less competitive and unable to effectively 
compete with other service providers that can freely recruit capable manpower. If KTF is not 
flexible in recruiting capable people, it will face serious problems in implementing its 
wireless Internet business and other new businesses.  
Fifth, the government is influencing the parent company KT, in deciding future 
technologies such as IMT-2000. The governmental influence on KT’s selection of 
technology will, in turn, have a significant influence on KTF’s selection of technology.   
Finally, the government policy changes disturb the market mechanism.  For example, the 
government policy on handset subsidies attracted a number of customers. When the 
government abolished the lock-in period, many customers moved to other service providers. 
As a result, KTF had to spend a huge amount of money to retain its customers. Later, the 
government eliminated the handset subsidy. Due to that change, not only KTF, but other 
mobile carriers experienced a decline in subscribers.  
Unlike KTF, which has been heavily regulated by the Korean government, NTT 
DoCoMo is very flexible in doing business. NTT DoCoMo has autonomy in recruiting and 
budgeting. The Japanese government decides neither the handset subsidy policy nor 
technology standard. In Japan, six to seven mobile carriers (including PHS) are competing in 
each market block. The government’s pro-competition policy results in lower airtime rates 
and monthly basic charges. The higher competitiveness of NTT DoCoMo is partly due to 
less intervention by the Japanese government in the Internet market.   
 
3.6. The Parent Company 
 
KT contributed to KTF’s success in several ways. In the beginning stage, KT did not 
intervene much in KTF’s business activities or managerial decisions.  KT’s reliable brand 
image gave KTF a positive image in attracting a number of new customers. KT also 
guaranteed KTF’s loan so that KTF didn't have any difficulties in drawing outside capital. In 
the marketing area, KT was also supportive, allowing KTF to have an integrated billing 
system with KT.  
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However, since 1999, the situation has changed. KT has been strengthening its influence 
on the management of KTF. For example, at the beginning of 2000 KT appointed two boards 
of directors. The two non-standing boards of directors in charge of important positions are 
currently working for KT. Somehow, they may negatively affect KTF when there are 
conflicting interests between KT and KTF. KT’s intervention will weaken KTF’s 
competitiveness in fast decision-making and exploration of new businesses. In addition, KT’s 
intervention on KTF’s technology selection will negatively influence KTF’s R&D staff 
members.  
The business areas of KT and KTF are overlapping. For example, KT and KTF both 
entered business areas such as wireline portal sites, Internet broadcasting, and IMT-2000 (a 
next-generation mobile communication service). Although KT and KTF have been working 
together to obtain the IMT-2000 license, each company insists that it should become the 
leader of this project.  
In contrast, NTT DoCoMo is enjoying its autonomy in various ways. The company 
recently received approval from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to launch 
IMT-2000. Whereas KT and KTF fight over primary leadership, NTT does not enter its 
subsidiary’s business area. NTT DoCoMo selected its technology for IMT-2000 without 
intervention by NTT.  NTT DoCoMo will begin its initial service in May, 2001.  
We have found that the parent company’s influence is substantial to its subsidiary. KTF 
was more competitive than other mobile carriers in terms of drawing a number of customers 
and exploring new businesses such as the wireless Internet. However, KTF will lose its 
competitiveness if KT continues to influence KTF’s business activities. The E-business era 
requires fast decision-making and active business implementation. KT’s intervention will 





The new mobile multimedia, coming from the wireless Internet, has its own value chain. 
It consists of content providers, service packages, gateway/transport operations, 
software/hardware interface manufacturers, and customer management. Through this value 
chain, with thorough understanding and analysis of the current competitiveness, companies 
can set up their strategies for the future. 
Figure 2 illustrates the diamonds of KTF and NTT DoCoMo before and after the 
introduction of the wireless Internet. As shown, KTF’s current diamond is smaller than NTT 
DoCoMo’s, meaning that the current competitiveness of KTF is weaker than NTT 
DoCoMo’s.  
Then, how can KTF become more competitive in the wireless Internet industry? Here we 










Figure 2. The Dimonds of KTF and and NTT DoCoMo before and after the wireless Internet 
 
KTF’s factor conditions and demand conditions have more room for improvement to be 
more competitive, rather than R&S and SSR. As for factor conditions, KTF must: 
-increase the business portion of the wireless Internet 
-spend more on the wireless Internet’s R&D 
-recruit more regular employees to implement a variety of new businesses 
-enhance the corporate brand image 
-implement a promotional plan that is suitable to the wireless Internet.  
Fortunately, however, the company’s employee productivity is the highest among domestic 
mobile carriers, and should be maintained as such. 
There is also a large room for improving KTF’s demand conditions. The market size of 
the wireless Internet will rapidly increase, so that KTF should induce more mobile-phone-
only users into PersNet. In addition, KTF has to develop a variety of services for young users 
in their 20s, who are the majority of KTF subscribers of PersNet. It should also consider 
teenage-users, whose portions are small but whose penetration rates are high. 
There is not a significant gap in R&S and SSR sectors between KTF and NTT DoCoMo. 
For R&S sector, KTF should maintain its ‘early-mover advantage’ in the domestic market by 
developing a variety of handsets that are suitable for wireless Internet service. In addition, it 
needs more strategically allied companies like content providers.  
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mean that the company needs no improvements or enhancements. There is still some room 
for improvement. First, KTF should develop a check and balance system to implement 
transparent management. Second, KTF needs to develop or modify its corporate vision so 
that it fits better with the mobile multimedia business in the 21st century. Third, KTF needs to 
restructure its corporation to maintain a slim structure. Finally, it has to expand outsourcing 
for more flexibility and develop timely ad-hoc strategies in case the business environment 
dramatically changes. 
We need to consider two more external dimensions of the typical diamond model: 
governmental impact, and parent company’s impact. As for the governmental impact, KTF 
needs to make an effort to be freed from governmental red-tape restrictions such as recruiting 
and budgeting. In addition, the current issue of the handset subsidy should be solved through 
cooperation with other service providers. KTF also needs to persuade its parent company, KT, 





The future of the wireless Internet is wide open and promising. The whole extent of the 
industry – networks, handsets, and contents – is being developed more rapidly than ever. The 
competition, however, will be harsher than ever, too. All the players in this industry will 
compete for the lion’s share, even though they are not all ‘early movers’. KTF has been the 
‘early mover’ by providing the wireless Internet service for the first time in the domestic 
market, and it has been very successful in the industry. However, KTF is facing strategic 
issues such as how to maintain its early mover advantage and how to direct its future path in 
the area of the wireless Internet service. 
The diamond model is a very useful tool in analyzing the current KTF’s competitiveness 
in the wireless Internet service and to show how to increase the firm’s competitiveness in that 
area. Our analysis has shown that KTF needs to improve its factor conditions and demand 
conditions more than its R&S and SSR, in order to maintain and enhance its competitiveness. 
We have also found that outside determinants such as the government and the parent 
company can make a great impact on KTF’s competitiveness. The less external intervention 
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